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First Quarter 2003Figure 1. The Ogallala is the largest freshwater aquifer in the world. The maps above show the saturated
thickness (vertical distance between the water table and the aquifer floor) of the Ogallala in 1996-97 and
the water level changes between 1980 and 1997. The aquifer is depleted in parts of northern Texas and west
central Kansas. A large share of Ogallala water lies beneath the Nebraska Sandhills, where the resource
remains largely untapped because crop irrigation is uneconomic (McGuire et al., 1999).
Conserving the Ogallala Aquifer: 
Efficiency, Equity, and Moral  Motives 
By Jeffrey M. Peterson, Thomas L. Marsh, and Jeffery R. Williams
The Ogallala Aquifer is a vast geologic formation
that sprawls underneath parts of eight states from
South Dakota to Texas. Early settlers in the semi-
arid High Plains were plagued by crop failures due
to cycles of drought, culminating in the disastrous
Dust Bowl of the 1930s. After World War II,
affordable technology became available to irrigate
from the Ogallala. The High Plains was then trans-
formed into one of the most agriculturally produc-
tive regions in the world.
To say that the High Plains economy now “runs
on water” is probably no exaggeration. Irrigated
crops provide feed for livestock, which are in turn
the primary inputs for local meat processing plants.
Water is also essential for the livestock production
and meat processing industries. The crop, livestock,
and meat processing sectors form the core of the
regional economy, accounting for a large share of
employment and gross output. Because the Ogal-
lala recharges very slowly, the High Plains economy
is dependent on a finite resource.
The fate of the High Plains has been a policy
issue since depletion of the Ogallala became appar-
ent in the 1970s. Policy makers have wrestled with
how—and whether—to conserve the groundwater
resource. This debate has recently returned to theFirst Quarter 2003 CHOICES 15
16fore at both state and federal levels. In 2001, Kan-
sas formed a special citizens’ committee to advise
the governor and legislature on potential ground-
water conservation policies (Ogallala Aquifer Man-
agement Advisory Committee, 2001). The renewed
interest within the High Plains states partly reflects
the recent drought and exhaustion of the aquifer’s
usable economic life in many areas (see Figure 1). 
The debate at the federal level has changed over
time. Debates in the 1970s focused on conserving
the Ogallala for national and international food
security. During the 2002 farm bill debate, the
focus shifted to the regional impacts of federal poli-
cies through their effects on water use. Because
water is so fundamental to the region’s livelihood,
policies affecting water use ultimately change the
scope and distribution of economic activity as well
as the use of land and other natural resources. Fed-
eral policies affecting water use in the High Plains
include commodity price programs, the Conserva-
tion Reserve Program, and cost-share programs for
investments in new technologies.
Central to policy debates is why water conserva-
tion should (or should not) be a policy priority. In
this article we discuss three policy motivations for
conservation: economic efficiency, equity, and
moral duty. Policy debates are shaped by the rela-
tive importance of these motivations to diverse
stakeholders. Reaching a consensus on these moti-
vations is difficult. Nonetheless, policy tools flexi-
ble enough to address different concerns may best
foster consensus-building.
Conserve for Economic Efficiency?
Economic efficiency means that resource use
should yield the greatest net benefit to society.
Allowing individuals to base their resource use on
private benefits and costs heightens economic effi-
ciency for many resources. Unfortunately, ground-
water is an exception to this rule. Because of its
common property attributes, the rate of groundwa-
ter use will likely exceed its most economically effi-
cient rate.
The inefficiency of unregulated groundwater
use is easy to demonstrate. Because each user holds
only the property right for pumping water, rather
than the entire bundle of property rights for the
water itself, withdrawals are governed by the “rule
of capture.” An individual pays only the pumping
cost and not for the value of the water removed
from the common pool. The private costs of pump-
ing are therefore less than the social costs of with-
drawing water. Excessive pumping is the result.
Research has shown that common pool
resources likely are overused if left unregulated. The
more difficult question is how such resources
should be governed for efficient use. In most High
Plains states, groundwater use is governed jointly
by state water laws and groundwater management
districts (GMDs) controlled by local irrigators.
Controls differ by state and district.
In Kansas, New Mexico, and Colorado, the
GMDs have adopted policies to deny new water
permits if water availability in surrounding wells
would be significantly reduced. In Texas, no such
restrictions are possible under the state water laws;
the Texas Supreme Court ruled that “the owner of
the land is the absolute owner of the soil and perco-
lating water” (Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. East). 
Whether the current combination of state and
local rules has achieved efficiency for the Ogallala is
an open question. The answer depends on the dif-
ference between social and private costs, or the
external costs, of groundwater pumping. These costs
are made up of three parts (Provencher & Burt,
1993; see box), all of which are hard to estimate.
Because the horizontal flow of groundwater is very
slow in the Ogallala (a crude average is about one
foot per day), external costs are local in nature. At
the same time, the flow rates of groundwater
depend on different geologic factors. Many previ-
ous studies found low depletion costs in large aqui-
The External Costs of Pumping from a Common Aquifer
• The stock cost is the loss in water to future users for each unit pumped by a current irrigator. 
• The depletion cost is increase in irrigation costs, due to higher pumping lifts and lower well capacities,
as one irrigator lowers the water table by pumping. 
• The risk cost occurs because groundwater is used as a buffer against the large variability in rainfall,
allowing irrigators to limit their exposure to production risk. If pumping becomes more expensive
because other users have lowered the water table, increases in the implicit premium for this insurance
expose an irrigator to more risk. CHOICES First Quarter 2003
fers such as the Ogallala, suggesting that economic
efficiency could be nearly attained with unregu-
lated pumping (e.g., Beattie, 1981; Gisser, 1983).
More recent studies found potentially large risk
costs and significant gains from groundwater man-
agement policies in arid regions (e.g., Tsur, 1990).
Little or no evidence is available for the stock cost. 
Conserve for Equity?
Although efficiency-centered policies would satisfy
the interests of private irrigators, such policies
would not necessarily protect the public interest.
An important part of the public interest is equity
(or “fairness”) in the distribution of water within
and across generations of users. Equity within gen-
erations depends on water conservation because,
despite the flatness of the High Plains, the bedrock
floor of the aquifer is extremely uneven. Since most
wells are drilled to reach bedrock, landowners
above deep parts of the aquifer can reach water even
when nearby shallow wells have become inopera-
tive. If conservation maintains a high water table,
then access to water will be distributed more equi-
tably.
Ensuring equity across generations, or sustain-
ability, is defined as “meet[ing] the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs” (World Com-
mission on Environment and Development, 1987,
p. 43). Sustainability requires attention to actions
now that may change the stock of physical and nat-
ural capital in the future.
For groundwater, sustainability depends largely
on technological change. At one extreme, future
generations could sustain their standard of living
with little water by relying on technological
improvements in crop varieties and irrigation sys-
tems. In the absence of new technologies, however,
future well-being depends heavily on water conser-
vation.
Sustainability goals often conflict with private
incentives. Intergenerational equity suggests that
current and future benefits should receive equal
weight in allocating a natural resource over time.
Individual users, however, discount future benefits
at their own costs of capital. Thus, sustainability
policies must consider differences in social and pri-
vate discount rates. 
Research can address the equity issue by evalu-
ating the substitutability between water and tech-
nology. Improved irrigation systems may not
reduce water use, particularly if irrigation runoff is
recaptured and reused (Huffaker & Whittlesey,
1995). In some cases, the rapid adoption of new
irrigation systems has enabled High Plains irriga-
tors to grow more water-intensive crops or to irri-
gate more land. 
Water Conservation: A Moral Principle?
Some environmental philosophers have argued that
efficiency and equity goals miss the fundamental
point. They believe that conservation of natural
resources should reflect moral duties. Such duty-
based ethics reflect the writings of Immanuel Kant,
who argued that all decisions should be based on
moral principles. For Kantians, natural resources
have their own moral standing, independent of
human benefits or costs. These views suggest a pol-
icy philosophy summarized in Aldo Leopold’s state-
ment from his Sand County Almanac: “A thing is
right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stabil-
ity, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong
when it tends otherwise.”
Such reasoning differs from mainstream eco-
nomic thought because social decisions would
reflect generic principles rather than the benefits
and costs of particular proposals. Nevertheless, such
arguments have influenced several policies; a nota-
ble example is the federal Endangered Species Act.
In the extreme, moral duties have also been called
upon to return the High Plains to a “buffalo com-
mons.”
Policies and Motives in the High Plains
Of the three motives, economic efficiency has
largely driven the shaping of water policies in the
High Plains. During the early years of develop-
ment, groundwater was considered inexhaustible
and its hydrology a mystery. Water laws that fos-
tered orderly and rapid development of the
resource increased efficiency, but policies came to
reflect the common pool nature of the aquifer as
development grew. In the 1974 Groundwater Man-
agement District Act, Kansas lawmakers concluded
that rules created by local districts were needed “for
the proper management of the groundwater
resources of the state; for the conservation ofFirst Quarter 2003 CHOICES 17
18groundwater resources; [and] for the prevention of
economic deterioration.” These districts later set
limits on new water permits based on the external
costs to nearby water users.
Sustainability motives have entered recent pol-
icy debates. The “zero depletion” proposal in Kan-
sas would limit an area’s withdrawals to the amount
of natural recharge over a prescribed time period.
Similarly, the “two pools” plan would restrict with-
drawals only after an area’s “usable pool” of water is
gone; the remaining “conservation pool” would be
preserved for future generations. Although the
Kansas Ogallala Management Advisory Committee
did not support these proposals, sustainability
remained an important goal. The committee’s
report made several recommendations for “extend-
ing the life of the aquifer and sustaining the vitality
of western Kansas” (2001, p. 7-8).
Flexible policy alternatives can address multiple
concerns and changes in policy needs over time.
Flexibility characterizes the tradable water deeds
policy first proposed a quarter century ago (Smith,
1977). In this policy, each water user would receive
an initial allocation of water permits that are then
forfeited for each unit pumped less recharge. For
instance, an irrigator initially may receive deeds for
pumping 1,000 acre-feet of water from a given
well. If 100 acre-feet are pumped the first year and
recharge is 25 acre-feet, then deeds for 925 acre-feet
remain for the next year. Irrigators could also buy
and sell deeds among themselves within prescribed
areas. Limiting the number of returnable permits in
individual years could address efficiency goals. Sim-
ilarly limiting the number of permits initially issued
could address equity and moral concerns.
The water deeds policy is a potential base of
comparison for other High Plains proposals. One
explanation for the opposition to the recent Kansas
proposals is their narrow focus on sustainability.
Many irrigators agree that restricting water use will
enhance sustainability. Nonetheless, the two pro-
posals did not clearly specify how the remaining
water would be allocated across space or time.
Absence of this provision caused considerable
uncertainty about future impacts on farmers and
local economies. The water deeds policy has a clear
mechanism for limiting and allocating water. Deeds
are not issued for the water needed for future gener-
ations, and market forces would allocate currently
usable water. In effect, water deeds would create a
market for the groundwater stock in the same spirit
as the markets for surface water that already func-
tion in parts of the American west and other arid
regions throughout the world.
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